



دانشکده علوم معقول و منقول  
تهران

# شرح حال صدر المتألهین شیرازی و تصنیف در حرکت

جوهریه

بقلم

حضرت آية الله آقای حاج سید ابوالحسن حسینی قزوینی

بمناسبت چهارصدمین سال تولد صدرالدین شیرازی

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The Faculty of Theology  
Tehran University

**The Biography of Sadr al-Muti'allihîn  
and a Discussion of Motion  
in the Category of Substance**

by

**His Holiness Hajj Sayyid 'Abu'l-Hasan  
Husainî Qazwînî**

On the occasion of the 400th anniversary  
of the birth of Sadr al-Dîn

Shirâzi

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# بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

شرح حال صدر المتألهین شیرازی و سخنی در حرکت جوهریه

بقلم

حضرت آیه الله حاج سید ابوالحسن حسینی قزوینی

حکیم ربانی و فیلسوف الهی و عارف متأله و فقیه متبحر صدرالدین محمد بن ابراهیم القوامی شیرازی یکی از اعظم مفاخر عالم تشیع و دانشمندان ایران بشمار میرود. تولد آن مرحوم در سال نهصد و هفتاد و نه قمری است چه آنکه در حاشیه اسفار خطی که بخط مرحوم قوام الدین احمد ولد مصنف اسفار که صدرالدین صاحب ترجمه است در مبحث اتحاد عاقل بمعقول از امور عامه آنجا که مصنف وصول بتحقیق مسئله اتحاد عاقل بمعقول را از افاضات خاصه الهیه بخود میداند چنین نوشته است که تاریخ این افاضه روز جمعه شهر جمادی الاولی در عام یکهزار و سی و هفت قمری است و نوشته که از عمر مصنف در این هنگام پنجاه و هشت سال گذشته است. و رحلت این بزرگوار در سنه یکهزار و پنجاه قمری است و پدراومیرزا ابراهیم از وزراء دوره صفویه بوده و ویرافرو زندی ذکور نبوده است بنذر شرعی ملتزم میشود که هر گاه دارای پسری صالح و موحد شد مال کثیری در راه خدا انفاق نماید.

پس از رسیدن صدرالدین بسن رشد که تحصیلات مقدماتی و بعضی از سطوح فقه و اصول را تکمیل نمود مسافرت بشهر اصفهان کرده و در آنجا در ابتداء در نزد مرحوم شیخ الاسلام وقت بهاءالدین محمد عاملی (ره) بتحصیل فقه و اصول و تکمیل آن پرداخت و بعد از تکمیل براهنمائی استاد بمحضر خاتم الحکماء و المجتهدین مرحوم سید محمد باقر استرآبادی مشهور به داماد و متخلص باشراق مشرف گردیده و علوم حکمیه را از انقاس قدسیه مرحوم میربنحواتم و اکمل استفاده نمود و از هر دو استاد خود اجازه محکمه دریافت فرموده چنانکه در اول شرح بر اصول کافی با نهایت ادب و تجلیل از آن دو بزرگوار اسم برده و اجازه خود را ذکر نموده.

و پس از مراجعت بشیر از چنانکه عادت دیرینهٔ ابناء عصر قدیم و حدیث همین است محسوس بود بعضی از مدعیان علم قرار گرفت و بقدری مورد تعدی و ایذاء و اهانت آنان قرار گرفت که در نتیجه از شیراز خارج و در نواحی قم در یکی از قری منزل گزید و بریاضات شرعیه از اداء نوافل و مستحبات اعمال و صیام روز و قیام در شب اوقات خود را صرف مینمود. و بطوریکه از اساتید مسموع حقیر شده هفت مرتبه با پای پیاده همراه قافله بحج مشرف گردید که الحق فوق همه ریاضات شاقه میباشد.

**مقام شامخ علمی صاحب ترجمه-** در فن فلسفه الهی و تحقق مسائل غامضه علم مافوق الطبیعه و استقامت فهم و حسن سلیقه بی نظیر و عدیل است و با اعتقاد حقیر در الهیات و فن معرفه النفس بر شیخ الرئيس را جح و مقدم است و در حسن تعبیر و سلاست کلام و جزالت منطق و تقریر کسی بیایه او نرسیده. در علم فقه صاحب نظر و تحقیق است چنانکه قولی از این بزرگ مرد در باب نیت در موضوع صاحب حدائق نقل نموده که استاد المتأخرین مرحوم شیخ مرتضی هم در کتاب طهارت از صاحب حدائق نقل کرده و هر دو تحسین و تصویب قول صاحب ترجمه را فرموده اند و چنین بنظر میرسد که خودم در شرح اصول کافی این تحقیق را دیده ام. و در علم رجال و حید و فرید عصر بوده چه آنکه در شرح اصول در شرح حال راویان اخبار و احادیث کافی تحقیقات دقیقه درج فرموده است. و در فن ریاضی از هندسه و هیئت ماهر بوده چنانکه از شرح اوبره دایه اثیر الدین ابهری مستفاد میشود و بزرگترین فضیلت علمی مرحوم صدر المتألهین تطبیق قواعد حکمت الهی با قواعد عرفان و طریقه عرفاء است و حال آنکه قبل از او مبانیست بین شرر حکمت و ذوق عرفان مشهور بوده.

**مقام زهد صاحب ترجمه-** بطور کلی بی اعتنا باوضاع دنیوی و شئون مادیه بوده است و بقدر ذره ای هم در مقام ارضاء خاطر عوام نبوده. در آن عصر که نوع مصنفین کتب دیباچه مصنفات خود را باسم پادشاه وقت یا یکی از وزراء و رجال مصدر مینمودند در مصنفات صدر المتألهین عین و اثری از این معنی نمودار نیست. با کثرت کتبی که نوشته و تألیف نموده در هیچیک اسمی از کسی نبرده است لیکن با اعتقاد حقیر با همه فضائل که در صاحب ترجمه بوده قدری ساده طبیعت بوده و عنان قلم را مالک نبوده است چه که بعضی



از مباحث علمی که هر چند حق دانسته شود نبایست در کتاب که سند عمومی است ثبت بشود زیرا که بطور قطع در مباحث دقیقه علم الهی و فن اعلی پاره حقائقی است که فهم و نیل آن در هر عصر مخصوص بیک یا دو نفر است. اذهان دیگران طاقت فهم و تحمل آنرا ندارند بلکه مطلبی بر خلاف واقع از کتاب تصور نموده بفهم قاصر خود آنرا بمصنف نسبت میدهند بالاخص اگر با اغراض نفسانیه و امراض روحیه شخص توأم گردد و البته تولید تشنیع و اهانت نسبت بمصنف کتاب خواهد نمود چنانکه صاحب ترجمه خود گرفتار بوده است.

**مصنفات آن مرحوم** بسیار است مثل شرح بر اصول کافی و مفاتیح الغیب که مقدمه تفسیر بر قرآن نگاشته است و تفسیر قرآن که مهمات آیات قرآنی را تفسیر و تحقیق فرموده و اسفار اربعه در فن حکمت اعلی در چهار سفر و شواهد ربوبیه که بسیار کتاب مطبوع و مشکلی است و مبدء و معاد و شرح بر هدایه اثیری و رساله حدوث و کتاب مظاهر و کتاب مشاعر و حکمة عرشیه و کتاب اسرار الایات و رساله در حشر جمیع اشیاء و رساله در تشخیص و رساله در اتصاف مهیت بوجود و رساله موسومه بسر النقطه و رساله در خلق الاعمال و رساله در تصور و تصدیق و رساله اجوبه نصیری و رساله کسر الاصنام و رساله در اجوبه مسائل معاصر خود شمس الدین کیلانی و حواشی و تعلیقات بر الهیات شفا و تعلیقات بر منطق و حکمت کتاب حکمة الاشراق سهروردی و شاید هم بعضی از نوشته های دیگر داشته که از بین رفته است.

**تلامید و شاگردان او** - مرحوم الله وردی خان که از رجال بزرگ دوره صفویه است مدرسه در شیراز بنا نموده که هنوز هم بنام مدرسه خان باقی است صدر المتألهین صاحب ترجمه را راضی نمود که در مدرسه وی تدریس نماید. چندین سال که آن مرحوم مشغول بافاقت بوده شاگردان بسیاری تربیت نموده است که عده ای از آنان برای حقیر معلوم است یکی مرحوم محمد بن مرتضی الملقب بمحسن المتخلصین بالفیض الکاشانی که سمت اختصاصی بمرحوم صدر الدین داشته و داماد وی بوده است. دوم: مرحوم مولی عبدالرزاق ابن الحسین الالاهیجی که متخلص بفیاض است و او نیز داماد استاد بود و بسیار محقق بوده و در تدبیر معاشرت و زندگی زبردست و هشیار بوده. مشرب او در

حکمت ظاهر آ مخالف طریقه استاد است و بنظر چنین مینماید که بمشرب مشائین نزدیک است ولی از آخر جلد دوم شوارق او مستفاد میشود که این خود تدبیر عملی بوده است . سوم : مرحوم شیخ حسین تنکابنی ، چهارم ملامحمدایروانی ، پنجم : شاه ابوالولی شیرازی ، ششم میرزا ابراهیم فرزند صاحب ترجمه، هفتم قوام الدین احمد فرزند دیگر آن مرحوم .

مدفن آن مرحوم - بیان کردیم که مرحوم صدرالمتألهین هفت سفر پیاده بمکه معظمه مشرف گردیده است در سفر هفتم در بصره داعی حق را لبیک گفته و روح بلند پرواز آن مرحوم بعالم قدس متصل گردیده و در بصره دفن شده است . قریب چهل سال قبل از یکی از سادات عرب ساکن نجف اشرف که ببصره مکرر رفته بود پرسیدم و از قبر صاحب ترجمه پرسش نمودم . همین قدر در جواب گفت در بصره قبری است مشهور به قبر ملاصدرای شیرازی ولیکن در این اواخر کسانی که برای تحقیق این معنی ببصره رفته بودند برای آنها چیزی و محلی معلوم نگردیده است و احتمال میرود که در اثر تغییرات اوضاع شهر ، نشانیهای قبر از بین رفته است . والله تعالی یعلم .

تحقیقات مختصات مرحوم صدرالمتألهین که ابتکار فرموده یا آنکه اگر سابقین گفته اند مبرهن نبوده است

یکی مسئله اصالت الوجود بنحو تحقیق و تشریح کامل .

دوم توحید خاصی بنحو صحیح برهانی .

سوم حرکة جوهریه بنحو کمال و تمام .

چهارم مسئله اتحاد عاقل بمعقول

پنجم اتحاد نفس ناطقه در سیر صعودی بعقل فعال .

ششم قاعده بسیط الحقیقه کل الاشياء .

هفتم قول باینکه النفس جسمانية الحدوث روحانية البقاء .

هشتم قاعده النفس فی وحدتها کل القوی .

نهم تجرد قوه خیالیه بتجرد برزخی .

دهم اثبات ارباب انواع بنحو اتم و بیان تحقیقی مراد سالفین از این مقال .

یازدهم تحقیق صور برزخیه و مثل معلقه بین عالم العقل و عالم الطبیعه .  
دوازدهم تحقیق معاد جسمانی بنحوی که خود اختیار نموده هر چند مرضی حقیر  
نیست و غیر ذاک ، ولیکن هذا اخر ما اردن من ترجمه حال صدر الدین جسم و وصل ایضاً  
والحمد لله حق حمده .

برای تکمیل مقاله مناسب دیدم که یکی از افکار عالیۀ مرحوم صدر المتألهین  
در این مختصر نقل نمایم که آقایان ناظرین و متفکرین متوجه به کمال عظمت فکری  
و دانش حکیمی آن مرحوم گردند و چون موضوع حرکت جوهریه و اقامۀ برهان  
بر اثبات آن که از خصائص فکری آن مرحوم و بسیاری از مطالب مختصه بآن مرحوم  
مترتب و متفرع بر اصل جوهریه است لهذا در بین افکار صاحب ترجمه همین اصل  
را بیان واضح و مبرهن اختیار نموده و بطور مبسوط آنرا مینگارم .

### سخن در حرکت جوهریه و تحولات ذاتیه

بدانکه این مطلب بسیار نفیس و پرفائده و از مهمات علم الهی است و معرفت  
بآن مفتاح بسیاری از حقائق حکمیه است و ما قبل از شروع در مقصد دو مقدمه تمهید  
و ذکر میکنیم :

**مقدمه اولی :** بدانکه موجود ممکن بر دو قسم است جوهر و عرض . جوهر آنرا  
گویند که قائم بذات خود باشد یعنی بنفس خود یکمرتبه از نفس الامر و عالم هستی  
محسوب و بشمار آید و هستی او از فروع و شئون هستی دیگر نباشد مانند جسم طبیعی  
و جوهر نفس و جوهر عقل . و عرض آنرا گویند که قائم بغیر است یعنی استقلال در وجود  
ندارد و جاعل و مبدع او ناچار وجود او را در موجود دیگر باید ایجاد نماید .

و لامخه ای از صفات و شئون آن موجود دیگر خواهد بود خواه عرض محسوس نباشد  
مثل سفید و سیاهی و طعم و بو و نرمی و درشتی و هکذا یا عرض محسوس باشد چون علم  
اگر علم را عرض بدانیم و مثل بلکه شجاعت و سخاوت و فرح و حزن و سائر اعراض  
نفسانیه . و چون عرض بطوریکه بیان شد تابع وجود جوهر است و از خود بهیچوجه در  
وجود استقلال ندارد پس در قوت وضعف نیز تابع قوت وضعف جوهر است که محل او است .  
مثلاً قوت و کمال بوی سیب و شیرینی آن تابع قوت صورت نوعیۀ جوهریه است



که حقیقت سیب است و همچنین هر گاه بوی و طعم سیب کامل و تمام نیست برای این است که هنوز سیب بخوبی نرسیده یعنی صورت جوهر به اوقوت نگرفته و بکمال جوهری خود نرسیده است .

و هم در سکون و قرار یا حرکت و جنبش عرض تابع جوهر است باین بیان که هر گاه جسم در عرض متحرك است و تدریجاً از نقص بکمال در یکی از اوصاف عرضیه خود میرود باید گفت که در جوهر ذات هم متحرك است و بهر حدی از درجات صورت جوهر به نوعیه خود که میرسد مطابق آن بحدی و درجه ای از درجات عرض و صفت خود و اصل میگردد و هر گاه جوهر در یکی از صفات خود قرار دارد و متحرك در مراتب آن صفت نیست معلوم میشود که در ذات جوهری خود هم ساکن و غیر متحرك است . و توضیح این مطلب بنحو اتم در مقامی که نتیجه مقدمات را بیان میکنیم خواهد آمد انشاء الله العزیز .

و بایست متوجه بود که این سخن در اعراض ذاتیه طبیعییه جوهر است مثل رنگ سرخ در گل و بوی سیب در سیب مثلاً ، یعنی قانون تبعیت عرض نسبت بجوهر در آن اعراضی است که منبعث از حاق جوهر و ذات او است نه در اعراض غریبه که از علت خارج در جسم تحقق میابد بمانند رنگی که به جسم از خارج برسد یا حرارت آب که بواسطه مجاورت آتش موجود شود زیرا که چنین اعراض که به سبب خارج محقق شود تابع علت خارجییه خود هستند در قوت و ضعف آن و مدت تأثیر آن چنانکه واضح و هویداست .

مقدمه ثانیه در این است که حرکت مطابق تعریف صحیح عبارت است از خروج شیئی از قوه در امری بفعل تدریجاً بیان آن اینکه حدوث امری در عالم تصور دو قسم ممکن است . یکی آنکه آن امر دفعه بدون لحاظ مدت و زمانی حادث شود و چنین امری را آنی الوجود گویند مثل حدوث موازات بین دو خط که موازات باهم نداشتند و متمایل بموازات میشوند زیرا که هر چند بهم متدرجاً نزدیک میشوند ولی این تمایل مقدمه موازات است نه حقیقت موازات که در آخرین مرحله بتمامه دفعه متحقق میشود . دوم آنکه امری حادث شود بتدریج یعنی هر گاه آن امر حادث را از ابتداء ظهور

وجود او تا آخر تکامل وجود مثل خطی فرض نمائیم که امتداد در جهت طول دارد منقسم خواهد شد باجزاء فرضیه که هر جزء آن در آنی وجود یافته و مجموع آن اجزاء در مقداری از زمان معین متحقق شود مثل رنگ سرخ در سیب که از ابتداء مراتب سرخی شروع بحدوث نمود تا برسد به نهایت آن رنگ از مبدء تا منتهی افرادی از ماهیت رنگ سرخ موجود میگردد. پس حرکت خارج شدن موضوعی است از فقدان صفتی و کمالی بسوی وجدان آن کمال بنحو تدریج و وجود هر جزئی بعد از جزء دیگر. و بتعبیر دیگر هر مقوله‌ای که حرکت در آن واقع میشود مثل مقوله کیف که فرد برای او تصور دارد یکی فرد آنی که دفعه متحقق میشود و دیگر فرد زمانی که متدرجاً موجود گردد و این وجود تدریجی را حرکت گویند.

بعد از تمهید دو مقدمه حال گوئیم حرکت در مقولات چهار گانه ( که این و کیف و وضع و کم ) باشند مورد قبول و اتفاق همه حکماء است و ذکر آنها و تمثیل لازم نیست. سخن در حرکت در جوهر و ذات متحرک است که آیا جائز است بحسب برهان عقلی اشغال و حرکت در صورت نوعیه جوهریه که او را طبیعت خوانند که در هر آنی متحرک فردی از جوهر وجود و ذات خود را واجد گردد و در آن دیگر وجود دیگر پیدا کند غیر وجود اول؟

شیخ الرئيس ابوعلی سینا که رئیس حکماء مشائیین است در اسلام انکار حرکت جوهریه را نموده و بشدت نفی این امر را مینماید و بعضی هم بعد از شیخ از اتباع او انکار حرکت در جوهر را نموده‌اند که از آنهاست مرحوم حکیم ماهر مولی عبدالرزاق لاهیجی در گوهر مراد و غیره.

و مرحوم صدر اعظم الحکماء محمد شیرازی صاحب اسفار اثبات این معنی را بنحو اکمل فرموده و تأسیس برهان بر طبق آن نموده و مدعی است که اوائل حکماء قبل از دوره اسلام بطور رمز اشارت باین معنی نموده‌اند و بالجمله در دوره اسلامی از بزرگان علم و تحقیق کسی مثل ایشان تشیید و تحکیم این مطلب مهم را نکرده است. و قبل از ذکر برهان بر اثبات آن بدان که صورت نوعیه در اجسام عبارت است از حقیقتی در جسم که آثار مخصوصه آن جسم مستند بآن صورت است زیرا که بدون

شك هر جسمی را آثار و اعراض خاصی است که در جسم دیگر نیست مانند خواص مختلفه انواع احجار و سنگهای پرقیمت و خواص انواع ادویه و اختلاف احوال انواع حیوان. و همین صورت نوعیه جوهریه اصل حقیقت هر چیزی است و تمییز وجدائی انواع از یکدیگر همین صورت نوعیه است که او را طبیعت هم مینامند و مقصود از حرکت در جوهر این است که اجسام خواه عنصریه خواه فلکیه در این صورت نوعیه متحرک هستند. و یکحد از این صورت زیاده بر يك آن در ماده جسمانیه باقی و ثابت نیست و همیشه در تبدل است.

و چون جوهر شئی در تبدل و تغیر است اعراض و اوصاف وی هم که بعد از مرتبه ذات او هستند در تبدل و تغیر میباشند و صاحب این قول عقیده دارد که نفوس ناطقه بشریه نیز که بمنزله صورت نوعیه اجساد و ابدان خود هستند حرکت جوهری و تغیر ذاتی دارند و میگویند نفس ناطقه در ابتداء فیضان بر بدن بسیار ضعیف و ناتوان باشد و باشتداد جوهری ذات او در حرکت و تبدل جوهری است تا بمرتبه نهایت قوت برسد، و بهمین علت صفات و افعال و احوال طفل در ابتداء بسیار ضعیف است و باشتداد جوهر ذات نفس احوال و صفات نیز اشتداد یافته رفته رفته قوت گیرند.

و نهایت تعجب و حیرت از شیخ الرئیس ابن سینا است که میگوید نفس ناطقه يك فرد عالم متبحر حکیم در سن هفتاد سال مثلاً از حیث درجه وجود مطابق بازمانی است که اینمرد شیر خوار بوده است، فقط تفاوت بین دو حال را به پیدایش اعراض و صفات کمالیه میداند که در ابتداء نبوده و در سن کمال بتحصیل و اکتساب حاصل گردیده اند بدون اینکه کوچکترین تفاوتی در جوهر ذات نفس حاصل شود. و این قول مخالف وجدان صریح هر عاقلی است که مراجعه بذات خود نماید.

حال مقتضی است که برهان بر ثبوت حرکت جوهریه را ذکر نمائیم بعونه تعالی. و چون بر همین بر ثبوت اینمعنی و مؤیدات آن بسیار است ما در این رساله دو برهان انتخاب نموده به بیان مخصوص خود نگارنده مینگاریم.

برهان اول این است که در سابق معلوم شد که اعراض عارضه بجسم مثل کیف

و کم و وضع و غیر آن که ذاتی هر جسمی است منبعث از حاقّ جوهر و صورت نوعیه آن جسم است و در حقیقت تولید عوارض و صفات جسم از صور طبیعیّه جوهریه است .  
 حال گوئیم ممکن نیست که علت مؤثره در وجود معلول با همه جهات علیه باقی و ثبات باشد و معلول زوال یابد و تغییر کند بلکه هر گاه معلول تبدّل یافت بدیهی است که علت مؤثره تبدّل یافته است .

مثلاً هر گاه فرض نمائیم رنگ طبیعی سیب در حد معنی مثل درجه اول آن آن رنگ از طبیعت جوهریه جسم تولید شد و طبیعت جوهریه علت تحقق رنگ در درجه يك گردید بعد رنگ که زیر طبیعت جوهریه است باذن الله تعالی تقدیر هر حرکت نسبت کمال و تغییر نمود و بدرجه دوم رنگ سرخی تحول یافت ناچار بایست قبول کرد که طبیعت جوهریه هم در وجود جوهری خود تحول بوجود قوی تر یافته . اوهم حرکت بکمال ذاتی خود نموده است بلکه تحول و تغییر علت از حد اول بعد دوم باعث تحول رنگ گردیده است . و هر گاه خلاف این سخن گفته شود یعنی بگوئیم که علت بحال خود باقی است و معیناً تاثیر در رنگ تغییر کرده و حد دوم را بوجود آورده است لازم آید که معلول بدون علت تحقق یابد زیرا که آنچه معلول و اثر علت بود درجه اول بود و اگر همان طبیعت بحال خود می بود رنگ هم در درجه اول باقی میماند و مفروض این است که رنگ و عرض تبدّل یافته است .

ملخص کلام آنکه برای عرض مثل رنگ درجاتی است و مراتبی است مختلفه از ابتداء ظهور آن تا نهایت کمال و هر يك از این مراتب دارای خصوصیت ممتازه هستند غیر خصوصیت حد دیگر و هر کدام از این مراتب اعراض مثل رنگ با خصوصیت ممتازه از طبیعت جوهریه تولید و صادر میشوند . پس ناچار مطابق درجات عرض بایست درجاتی هم در وجود جوهری طبیعت که مصدر است قائل شویم که هر حدی خاص از حدود عرض از حدی از حدود جوهر صادر شود و همینطور که بحر کت و جنبش عرض سیر بکمال میکنند و در هر حدی زیاده بر يك آن قرار ندارد طبیعت جوهریه نیز بحر کت و سیر حدود خود را طی نموده و در هر حدی از حدود جوهری خود بیش از يك آن ثابت نیست و بعد دیگر متحول میشود .

این است برهان محکم بر حرکت جوهریه در طبایع عالم کون و فساد و در نفوس متعلقه با بدن طبیعی و بالجمله عالم جسمانی سر تا سر در تغییر و حرکت و سیر بمقصدی است که قافله سالار این سفر طبیعی طبایع جوهریه و نفوس میباشند .  
و محصل کلام آنکه عقل صریح حکم میکند که علت متغیر متغیر است و علت ثابت ثابت و هر گز نمی توان متغیّرات را بحیثیت تغییر و تحول مستند بعلمت ثابت از لحاظ ثبوت و استقرار نمود .

(اعضال و حیل) هر گاه کسی بخواهد انکار حرکت جوهریه را بنماید و محذور استناد اعراض متغیره را بطبیعت ثابت بمحرک وضع کند چنین گوید که نهایت حکم عقل این بود که لازم است متغیر و متحرک معلول و مستند بعلمت متغیر باشد و زائد بر این عقل حکمی واقتضائی ندارد ، و ما میتوانیم این قاعده عقلیه را رعایت و حفظ نموده از راه دیگر بدون اینکه ملتزم وقائل بحرکت جوهریه در طبیعت بشویم . و بیان مشروح آن راه دیگر و طریق آخر این است که متحرک بطرف هر مقصدی از ابتداء شروع بجنبش و حرکت هر چه حرکت کند در هر مرحله بمقصد هم نزدیکتر میشود ولیکن این قرب و نزدیکی بمقصد هم متغیر و دارای مراتب متفاوت است ، چنانکه بدیهی است متحرک بمقصدی که در آخر سه فرسخ است همین هر يك فرسخ طی مسافت نموده مقداری قرب بنقطه مقصود پیدا میکند و بعد از قطع دو فرسخ از مسافت قرب او بمقصد زیاده تر میشود . پس چون مراتب قرب متغیر است و طبیعت هم بکمک قرب مخصوص بحدی مصور آن حد میشود و اینکه در آن حال مصور حد بعد نمی شود برای این است که هنوز قرب بحد بعد که جزء علت است فراهم نیست .

پس علت تجدد عرض مثل رنگ و طعم تجدد و تغییر طبیعت نیست بلکه علت تجدد و تعاقب درجات عرض تجدد و تفاوت و تعاقب مراتب قرب بمقصد متحرک است . و تا این احتمال باقی است ، اثبات حرکت جوهریه را برهان مذکور نتوان نمود و برهان ناتمام خواهد بود . جواب از این شبهه موقوف است بر تمهید مقدمه دقیق که در موارد بسیاری از مباحث علم الهی نافع و بکار برده شده است .

لهذا گوئیم علت که سبب وجود معلول است بر دو قسم است :

اول علت فاعلیه که علت موجد هم گویند و تفسیر آن این است که هر موجودی که ترشح از موجود دیگر نمود که بمنزله سایه و پرتو او شد موجود اول را معلول و دوم را علت مؤثره و فاعلیه و موجد خوانند مانند آتش برای حرارت و احتراق و حرکت بد برای حرکت مقناح . . .

قسم دوم علت معدّه است که او را در ایجاد و تکوین دخلی نیست بلکه اثر او همین است که ماده را برای گرفتن اثر از فاعل و موجد نزدیک بفاعل میکند مانند خشکی همزم برای قبول احتراق از آتش و مانند رحم برای اینکه نطفه را مهیا نماید از برای گرفتن صورت انسانیت از بخشنده صورت جلّ ذکره . پس علت معدّه کمک معلول است در قبول فیض نه اینکه کمک علت فاعلیه است در اعطاء فیض و بین این دو مطلب فرق عظیمی است که نباید بر فطن عاقل پوشیده بماند .

حال گوئیم که درجات مختلفه قرب و نزدیکی بمقصد متحرک از قسم علت معدّه بشمار میرود یعنی هر حدی از حدود در حرکت مهیا میکند موضوع را برای حد لاحق که تا حد اول را واجد نشود قابل و مهیا برای صدور حد دوم نخواهد بود پس تغییرات و تبدلات مراتب قرب تأثیری در اختلاف اقتضاء طبیعت جوهریه در صدور درجات مختلفه عرض ندارد بلکه تأثیر در اختلاف مراتب قبول موضوع دارد و در نتیجه محذور استناد متغیر الطبیعه ثابت باقی ماند و چاره ای جز حرکت جوهریه در رفع محذور نیست . در این مرحله تأمل و تدبر کافی لازم است چون بسیار دقیق و عمیق است .

برهان دوم برای اثبات حرکت جوهریه در آن است که در مقدمه این مبحث بیان کردیم که عرض در وجود و شئون وجود خود تابع محض جوهر است و بهیچوجه استقلال و انفراد در وجود برای عرض متصور نیست و هر گاه توهم این بشود که در امری استقلال در او راه یابد یعنی بدون ارتباط بموضوع حکمی را برای وی تصور نمائیم از حقیقت عرضیت خارج و انقلاب در ماهیت در وی لازم آید و این خود به بداهت عقل محال است .

پس گوئیم یکی از شئون وجود عرض سکون و حرکت است و این دو حکم راجع

بوجود عرض است مثل اینکه گوئیم لون ثابت و لون متغیر و طعم ثابت و طعم متغیر . و بنا بر انکار و نفی حرکت جوهریه لازم آید که در صورت حرکت جسم در کیف یا کم یا وضع یا مقوله این کیفیت یا کمیت جسم مثلاً در حال تبدل و تغیر از موضوع که جسم است جدا شوند و در این حکم یعنی خروج از قوه بفعل تدریجاً متصل باشند و این نحو وجود تدریجی برای کیف و کم باقطع نظر از موضوع ثابت باشد و بالضروره لازم آید که از ماهیت عرضیه خود خارج و منقلب بجوهر شوند و این بالضروره محال است . ولیکن بنا بر قول بحرکت جوهریه حرکت عرض و تغیر آن از شئون حرکت موضوع که جوهر است خواهد بود و قانون عرضیت که تابعیت محض است محفوظ خواهد بود و هو المطلوب .

(عقد و حل) بدانکه عمده نظر شیخ الرئيس و اتباع او در نفی حرکت جوهریه اشکال در بقاء موضوع است که در هر حرکتی بقاء موضوع عقلاً لازم است و عقیده شیخ این است که در حرکت جوهریه موضوع باقی در احوال مختلفه تصور ندارد . توضیح اشکال آنکه در هر حرکتی ناچار از امور ششگانه است :

اول مبده و آغاز حرکت .

دوم انجام و منتهی حرکت .

سوم محرک که سبب تحریک است .

چهارم مافیه الحرکه یعنی مسافتی که متحرک حدود آنرا بحرکت قطع نماید .

پنجم مالاجله الحرکه یعنی چیزیکه حرکت برای او و بداعی او وقوع یابد .

ششم متحرک یعنی ذات موصوف بحرکت که ازحالی بحالی انتقال یابد و این

را موضوع حرکت گویند و بالضروره باید موضوع حرکت در جمیع انواع حرکات باقی و محفوظ باشد زیرا که هر گاه موضوع باقی نماند و معدوم شود نمی توان گفت که شئی واحد از قوه بفعل در امری خارج شده است بلکه باید گفت موضوعی بوده و معدوم شد و موضوع دیگر بوجود جداگانه موجود شد و اینمطلب نهایت وضوح را دارد و حاجتی بیست و توضیح ندارد .

بعد از اینکه معلوم شد که بقاء موضوع متحرک در حرکت لازم است حال گوئیم



در انواع حرکات چهار گانه که حرکت جسم در کیف و کم و وضع و این که ممکن است موضوع جوهر است و در اعراض چهار گانه متبذل و متغیر میشود مثل اینکه آب وقتی که حرکت نمود از برودت بحرارت گرم شد در هر دو حال چه برودت و چه حرارت جوهر آب محفوظ است و در صنعت خود تغییر کرده است . پس موضوع حرکت در حرکات عرضیه محفوظ و باقی است .

ولیکن در حرکت جوهریه چون ذات و حقیقت شئی متبذل میشود موضوع قهراً باقی نمی ماند و ذات شئی در تبذل خود باقی نمی ماند . پس حرکت در جوهر عقلاً معقول و جائز نیست .

این حاصل اشکال شیخ و در احوال بحرکت جوهریه و مر حوم حکیم لاهیجی که در حکمت مشرب روشن مشائیین را دارد در کتاب گوهر مراد فارسی خود تقریر اشکال را باین عبارت که نقل میکنم فرموده و عبارت آن مر حوم این است «حرکت در مقوله جوهر ممکن نیست بسبب آنکه جوهر ذاتی جسمی است و حرکت در ذاتیات جائز نیست چه تمامیت شئی بذاتیات است . پس اگر ذاتی از ذاتیات شئی او را حاصل نباشد آن شئی آن شئی نخواهد بود و چون آن شئی نباشد صادق نیست که آن شئی بسوی ذاتی خود حرکت کرده باشد . » و جواب از این سخن آنکه در حرکت جوهریت شئی حرکت میکند از حدی از جوهریت سوی حد دیگر آن و تمام حدود که در حرکت جسم طی مینماید از مراتب جوهریه بشمار میروند نه اینکه از جوهریت منتقل میشود بحقیقت دیگر که جوهر نیست تا لازم آید که ذاتی شئی او را حاصل نباشد و موضوع منقلب شود از جوهریت بحقیقتی که ضد جوهریت است و از شخص بارع در فن این سخنان بسیار عجیب است .

و اما جواب از کلام شیخ هر چند از رد کلام لاهیجی معلوم شد لیکن تفصیل مطلب در جواب شیخ این است که در حرکت جوهریه هر چند درجات و مراتب صورت جوهریه متصل در تبذل و تقیید میباشند و هر حد و مرتبه از صورت جوهریه زیاده بر یک آن بقاء ندارند لیکن قدر جامع بین همه مراتب صورت در قول حرکت محفوظ و باقی است و مراد از نقد جامع شیخ وجود صورت است که عرض وجودی دارد و شخصیت وسیع دارد که با همه تفاوت مراتب شخصیت آن وجود محفوظ است .

پس هر چند تبدلات و تغییرات مراتب و درجات صورت جوهریه باقی نیست، ولی آن حقیقتی که این مراتب مختلفه حدود و ظهورات آن حقیقت هستند باقی است از ابتداء حرکت تا نهایت آن. مثلاً يك فرد از انسان از اول تولد و شیرخوارگی تا سن شصت سال برسد در دوره عمر خود اطوار مختلفه سیر نموده و در هر طوری از آن اطوار اسم خاص و احکام مخصوص و آثار خاصه دارد از رضیع بودن و صباوت و ترعرع که قریب ببلوغ است و جوانی و کهولت و پیری، و تمام این مراتب را شخص بحرکت جوهریه و تطورات ذاتیه باخر میرساند.

مع هذا حقیقت شخصیه او تغییر نمیکنند و در همه این مراتب همان شخص اول باقی است برای اینکه شخصیت يك فرد جامع همه این اطوار است و لهذا چون ذات و حقیقت او محفوظ است هر گاه در جوانی جنایتی مثل قتل نفس از او صادر شود و در پیری ورثه مقتول بر او دست یابند او را قصاص مینمایند و نمی تواند بگوید قاتل شخص جوان بود و من فعلاً پیر شده ام و شخص عوض شده است هر گز این عذر رانمی پذیرند و نباید هم پذیرفت. پس بحمد الله اشکال عدم بقاء موضوع در حرکات جوهریه مندفع شد.



As for the objection of Ibn Sinâ, although it has been removed in the response to Lâhijî, in detail it can be answered as follows: In substantial motion, although the degrees and grades of the substantial form are continuously in the process of change and each limit and degree of the substantial form does not last for more than a moment, yet the totality of all of the degrees of the form in motion subsists and is preserved. By the totality of all the degrees is meant the essential existence of form which has accidental existence and such an extended identity that despite all the different degrees the, identity of that being is preserved.

Therefore, although the changes and transformations of the degrees and grades of the substantial form are not subsistent, that reality of which these degrees are the limits and appearances is subsistent from the beginning to the end of the motion. For example, an individual human being from the moment of birth and early childhood to the age of sixty passes through different stages in his life and in each stage has a particular name and set of characteristics from the earliest childhood to early youth, adolescence, maturity and old age. The individual traverses all these stages by means of substantial motion. Yet, the reality of his personal identity does not change and in all of these stages the same person subsists, for the person is the complete and total individual encompassing all of these stages. And since his essence and reality is preserved whenever he commits a crime such as murder in youth, and in old age the family of the murdered person succeed in laying their hands on him they can take revenge upon him, and the murderer cannot say that he was then young and is now old and his personality has meanwhile changed. No one will accept this excuse and should not accept it.

So, thanks be to God the difficulty of the subject not persisting in substantial motion has been removed.

4. The distance which the moving object crosses in the process of motion.

5. That for which the motion takes places.

6. That which moves, i.e., the essence that has the feature of moving and is called the subject of motion which is transformed from one condition to another. It is necessary for this subject to remain extant and preserved in motion. And if it does perish then one cannot say that a single subject has gone from potentiality to act; rather, it must be said that there was a subject which has perished and another subject which has come into existence separately. This point is quite obvious and does not need any explanation and clarification.

After it has become established that the persistence of the subject in motion is necessary we say that in the four kinds of motion, i.e., the motion of a body in quality, quantity, position and place, the subject is the substance which is transformed and changed in the four accidents. For example, when water moves from cold to heat it becomes warm and in both cases, whether it be in the state of cold or heat, the substance of the water is preserved while its accidents have changed. Therefore, the subject of motion in various forms of accidental motion is preserved. In the case of substantial motion, however, since the essence and reality of an object changes, the subject per force does not subsist and the essence of the object does not endure through these transformations. Therefore, substantial motion is not reasonable and permissible from a rational point of view.

This was the summary of Ibn Sinâ's objection to substantial motion. Hakîm Lâhijî, who follows the Peripatetic school in philosophy, in his book *Gauhar-Murâd*, written in Persian, explains this objection in the following words:

"Motion in the category of substance is possible, for substance is essential to bodies and the essence of things cannot partake of motion, for the total existence of a thing depends upon its essential characteristics. Therefore, if it does not possess any of these essential features, that thing will no longer be itself, and if it is not the same thing it is not true to say that thing has moved toward that which is essential to it."

The answer to these words is that in substantial motion an object moves from one limit of substantiality to another limit not that it becomes transformed from substance to another reality which is not substance, so that it does not become necessary for it to leave its own essence and become something else, or be transformed from substance to something other than substance. A saying such as this is very strange to hear from a person who is well versed in this subject.

degrees of acceptability of the subject. Thus, the difficulty of relating a changing nature to a permanent one remains and there is no way to overcome it save by accepting substantial motion. One must pay much attention to this point, for it is very profound and delicate.

**The Second Demonstration** for the proof of substantial motion is in that which we explained at the beginning of this discussion, i.e., accident in its degrees of existence depends completely upon substance and has no independence of its own. Whenever we imagine that it has become independent in some matter, that is, we consider some judgment to hold true for it without reference to its subject, we have gone outside of the reality of the accident, and there must therefore be a transformation in the quiddity of the accident which itself, rationally speaking, is impossible.

We thus say that one of the degrees of the existence of accident is motion and rest, these two states belonging to the existence of the accident, just as if we were to say permanent and changing color or taste. According to those who deny substantial motion it is necessary that in the case of motion in the category of quality, quantity, place or position, the quality or quantity of the body, for example, become separated from its subject, which is the body, in the process of change and transformation. It must also be continuous in the process of going from potentiality to act, while this type of existence for quality or quantity must be permanent irrespective of the subject. This in turn means that these accidents must change their quiddity and become substance, which, however, is impossible.

According to those who accept substantial motion, however, the change of an accident and its transformation is an aspect of the motion of the subject which is the substance, and the principle that an accident is pure subservience is preserved. And this is the desired end.

**Problem and Solution.** Know that the basic reason of Ibn Sinâ and his followers in rejecting substantial motion resided in the question of the persistence of a subject, a persistence which is logically necessary in motion. Ibn Sinâ's belief is that in substantial motion one cannot imagine a subject which subsists through the various states of the motion.

The answer to this difficulty can be given by considering the fact that there are six factors involved in every motion:

1. The beginning of the motion.
2. The end of the motion.
3. The agent which causes the motion.

that is demanded by reason. We can observe this rational principle in another way which is as follows: A moving object from the beginning of its motion toward a goal, no matter how much it moves and approaches its goal at each stage, moves in such a way that its distance and proximity toward its goal changes also and partakes of degrees. As is evident, when an object moves toward a goal three miles away, after travelling one mile it has a certain proximity toward its goal and after travelling two miles its proximity changes and it moves closer to the goal. The fact that the degrees of proximity are different and nature through the existence that has a particular limit gives form to that limit and does not give form to the next degree or limit is due to this that the proximity and particular distance to the next degree which is part of the cause of that degree has not been provided. Therefore, the cause of the renewal of an accident like color and taste is not the change of nature but the renewal, difference and succession of the various degrees of approximity to the goal. Or this possibility still remains, so that one cannot give the above proof for substantial motion and the demonstration remains incomplete.


The answer to this criticism depends upon a detailed introduction which is useful and beneficial in many problems of metaphysics. So, we say that the ontological cause of an effect is of two kinds:

First, the active cause which is also called the ontological (*mūjizah*) cause. This means that whenever a being is issued forth from another being and is like the shadow or emanation of that being, then the first being is called effect and the second the active, effective or ontological cause, like fire for heat and turning and the motion of the hand for the turning of the key.

The second kind is the preparing (*mu'iddah*) cause which plays no part in bringing the effect into being. Rather, its effect is that it prepares matter for accepting the effect of the active and ontological cause, such as the dryness of wood for accepting burning from fire and the womb for preparing the sperm to accept human form from the Giver of Forms (God). Therefore, the preparing cause helps the effect in accepting the divine effusion and does not aid the active cause in giving effusion. Between these two kinds there is a great difference which must not remain hidden to the intelligent observer.

Now, we say that the different degrees of proximity to the goal of the moving object is of the kind of preparing cause, i.e., each degree of motion prepares the subject for the next degree which does not arrive until the first degree has been reached. Therefore, changes and differences in the degrees of proximity have no influence upon the differences that are suitable to the substantial nature in issuing forth various degrees of accidents. Rather, they influence the different





will and is transformed into a new degree of color, it must be admitted that the substantial nature has also changed in its substantial existence and has become transformed to a stronger degree of being. It has also moved toward its own essential perfection, and in fact the change of the cause from the first to the second limit is the reason for the change in the color.

Whenever one opposes this view by saying that the cause remains unchanged in its own condition and still the change in the color to the second degree occurs, it becomes necessary for the effect to become actualized without a cause, for that which was the effect was the first degree of the color, and if that nature remains unchanged the color would also have to remain in the first degree, while we have supposed that the color and qualities have been transformed.

The summary of our explanation is this, that for an accident like color, there are different degrees and grades from its origin to perfection, each of which has distinguishing features different from others. Moreover, each of the grades of these accidents such as color with its distinct character is brought into being by the substantial nature. Therefore, in accordance with the grades of the accident we must accept grades in the being of the substantial nature that has produced it in such a manner that each particular limit of the accident is produced by a particular grade of the substance. And just as accident reaches perfection through motion and does not remain in one condition for a moment, substantial nature also travels through its limits by motion and does not rest in each degree of its substance for more than a moment, after which it is transformed to a new degree.

This is the well-established demonstration of substantial motion in the natures of the world of generation and corruption and in souls united with natural bodies. The whole of the corporeal world is in motion and journeying toward an end in a caravan whose leaders in this natural journey are the substantial natures and souls.

The result of our discussion is that our intelligence leads us to the conclusion that the cause of that which changes is changing and the cause of that which is unchanging is permanent and one cannot relate changing things in their aspect of change to a permanent cause considered in its aspect of subsistence and permanence.

**Difficulties and their solutions**-If someone wants to deny substantial motion and overcome the difficulty of relating a changing effect to a permanent cause he can say that the light of intellectual judgment requires that a changing and moving effect be related to a changing cause, and nothing above

man which is like the form of the species of his body also partakes of substantial motion and is changing. Those who hold to this doctrine believe that the rational soul at the beginning when it first joins the body is very weak and only through substantial motion and change does it reach the ultimate degree of strength. For this reason the qualities, acts and states of a child are at first quite weak and only after the strengthening of the substance of the essence of the soul the qualities and acts become also gradually strengthened.

One is thoroughly amazed at Ibn Sinâ when he says that the rational soul of a learned and astute sage at the age of seventy in its degree of being is the same as when he was a baby, the only difference between the two cases being in the appearance of accidents and perfections which did not exist at the beginning but have been acquired later in maturity through study without there being any differences brought about in the substance of the soul's essence. This saying is opposed to the clear conscience of every intelligent person who refers to his own being.

It is now appropriate to mention the demonstration for the proof of substantial motion with God's aid. Since the demonstrations for the proof and confirmation of this meaning is numerous, in this treatise we have selected two demonstration which we have described in our own manner.

**The First Demonstration** concerns that which went before, i.e., accidents like quality, quantity, position and others which are essential to each body and derive their existence from the very substance and form of the species of that body. In reality the creation of the accidents and qualities of a body comes from the natural substantial form.

Now, we say that it is impossible that cause which has an influence upon the effect can remain in every way subsistent and unchanging while the effect changes and perishes. Rather, each time the effect changes, the cause which has an influence upon it must also change.

For example, if we suppose that the natural color of an apple in its first degree is created by its substantial nature and that substantial nature is the ontological cause for that color in that degree, then if the color which is under the influence of the substantial nature moves toward perfection by God's

categories of place, position, quality and quantity is accepted by all the philosophers and sages and there is no need to cite an example. What concerns us here is motion in substance and the moving essence of things, and whether according to rational demonstration motion in the substantial form of the species, which is called nature, that is moving at every moment and brings into being a particular instance of the substance of its being and its essence at every instant, is possible

Ibn Sinâ, who is the master of the Peripatetics in Islam, denies substantial motion and rejects it vehemently. Some of his followers have also denied motion in the category of substance as for example the astute sage Maulâ 'Abd al-Razzâq Lâhijî in his *Gauhar-murâd* and other works.

The foremost among the sages, Muhammad Shîrâzî, the author of the '*Asfâr*', has provided this point perfectly and has established demonstrations according to it. He points out that the philosophers in the pre-Islamic period had indicated this truth in a symbolic language, but in the Islamic period no one has been able to establish the validity of this principle with such rigor and strength.

Before giving a demonstration to prove this point, know that the form of the species (*sûrat-e nau'iyah*) is the truth in each body from which derive all the effects that belong particularly to that body, for each body has effects and accidents that are particular to itself and are not to be found in other bodies, as for example the different properties of various stones and jewels and the properties of various drugs and the different conditions of animals.

This substantial form of the species which is also called nature is the basic reality of each thing and also the cause of the distinction between various species. By substantial motion is meant that this form of the species of the elemental as well as celestial bodies partake of motion, and a particular limit of this form does not remain fixed in matter for one moment, rather it is always in transformation.

Since the substance of a thing is in change and transformation, its accidents and qualities which come after its essence must be also changing and becoming transformed. Mullâ Sadrâ thinks in fact that the rational soul of

which derive from the substance and the essence of the object itself and not from external accidents which come into being as a result of external causes such as a color that has been painted upon an object from the outside or the heat of water which results from its being near a fire. The reason is that these accidents which come into being as a result of external factors depend in their strength and weakness and duration upon the external cause, as is evident.

**The second introduction** concerns the fact that motion according to the correct definition is the becoming actual or that which is potential, gradually. By this is meant that the coming into being of something in this world can be conceived in either two ways :

One, that it occurs suddenly without taking any time or duration. Such a thing is called having sudden existence (*'āni al-wujūd*) such as the becoming parallel of two lines which were not parallel before and were approaching to become parallel to each other. In such a case although the two lines are gradually approaching to become parallel this is only an introduction not a being really parallel which becomes a reality all of a sudden.

Second, that a thing come into being gradually, i.e. whenever we consider it from the moment of its coming into being until its perfection, it is like an extended line which can be divided into parts, each of which has come into being at a moment and the totality in a fixed time. Such is the case of the redness of an apple where from the moment that the coloring begins until it is perfected, from the beginning to end, individual instances from the quiddity of red color come into being. Motion is thus the departure of a subject from deficiency of a quality and perfection toward the realization of that perfection gradually and in such a manner that one part follows another. In another word in whatever category motion takes place such as for example quality, one can imagine individual instances, one type of which is the immediate instance realized immediately and the other the temporal instance which becomes realized gradually. This gradual becoming is called motion.

After these two introductions we now say that motion in the four

By accident is meant that which subsists by other than itself, i.e., it has no independence in existence. Its creator and originator must of necessity create its existence in another being and must therefore be among the qualities and aspects of that other being, whether that accident be sensible like white and black and taste, smell, softness, hardness, roughness and the like, or whether it be non-sensible like knowledge (*'ilm*) if we consider knowledge as an accident or perhaps like bravery, generosity, joy and sadness and other accidents of the soul.

Since accident as explained above depends upon the existence of substance and has no independent existence of its own, in strength and weakness also it must follow the strength and weakness of substance which is its abode (*mahall*). For example, the strength and perfection of the perfume and taste of an apple depends upon the strength of the substantial form of the species (*sūrat-e nau'iyah-e jauharīyah*) which is the reality of the apple. And if the smell and taste of the apple are not perfect and complete it is because the apple is not as yet ripe, i.e. its substantial form has not as yet become strong and its substance has not as yet reached perfection.

In motion and rest also accident is subservient to substance in the sense that whenever a body undergoes motion in its accidents and qualities, it must be said that the substance of its essence is also in movement, and to whatever degree of its substantial form of species it reaches to the same extent and degree does it attain in its accidents and qualities. And when substance exists in one of its qualities and that which moves is not of the degree of that quality, it becomes evident that it is also unchanging and without movement in its substantial essence. We shall explain this matter fully in the conclusion of these introductory remarks, if God wills.

It must be remembered that this discussion concerns accidents belonging to the essential nature of the substance such as the color red in flowers and the smell of apple in an apple. By that is meant that the law of the subservience of the accident to the substance holds true only in the case of accidents

**Seven**-The belief that the soul is brought into being with the body but has spiritual subsistence independent of the body.

**Eight**-The rule that the soul is one in its many faculties.

**Nine**-The subsistence and catharsis of the power of imagination in the intermediate world (*barzakh*).

**Ten**-Complete proof of the truth of the archetypes or "Platonic ideas" and what the ancients meant by them.

**Eleven**-Inquiry into the intermediate forms ( *suwar barzakhīyah* ) and reflected images(*muthul mu'allaqah*) between the world of the intelligibles and Nature.

**Twelve**-Inquiry into bodily resurrection in a manner of his own which is not to our satisfaction, and other principles.

And this ends our discussion of Sadr al-Dīn's life and works, thanks be to God.

In order to complete this article we thought it appropriate to discuss in brief one of the heights of Mullā Sadrā's doctrines so that the reader may come to realize the great power of thought and elevation of metaphysical knowledge of that sage. Since the principle of substantial motion and the demonstrations of its reality is characteristic of his doctrines and many other problems are derived from it we have chosen to explain and prove this principle in greater detail.

## A Discussion of Substantial Motion

Know that this question is extremely worthy and valuable; it is among the most important in the science of metaphysics. Before beginning the discussion we shall mention two introductions :

**First introduction** : Know that possible being (*mumkin*) is of two kinds: substance(*jauhar*) and accident(*'arad*). Substance is that which subsists through its own essence, that is, considered in itself it becomes all at once a part of the world of existence, and its existence is not derived from and is not an aspect of another being, such as the natural body, the substance of the soul and the intellect.

and very astute and clever in his daily life. His method in metaphysics seems to be on the surface opposed to that of his master and apparently close to the school of the Peripatetics. From what is written at the end of the second volume of the *Shawâriq*, however, it can be concluded that this itself was a practical contrivance (to protect him from possible opposition). Third, Shaikh Husain Tunikâbunî, fourth, Mullâ Muḥammad 'Irwânî, fifth, Shâh 'Abu'l-walî Shîrâzî, sixth, Mirzâ 'Ibrâhîm, the son of Mullâ Ṣadrâ, and seventh, Qawân al-Dîn 'Aḥmad, his other son.

**The Cite of Mullâ Ṣadrâ's Tomb.** As we explained above, Ṣadr al-Muti'allihîn made the pilgrimage to Mecca seven times on foot and passed away and his soul joined the spiritual world on the seventh journey in Basra and was buried in that city. About forty years ago we asked one of the descendants of the prophet (*sâdât*), residing in Najaf who had travelled often to Basra, about the tomb of Mullâ Ṣadrâ. He responded that there was a tomb in that city commonly known as the tomb of Mullâ Ṣadrâ Shîrâzî. Of late, however, people who have gone to Basra to inquire about this matter could discover nothing, and it may be that due to changes in the plan of the city all signs of the tomb have been destroyed. And God knows best.

**Points which belong especially to Ṣadr al-Muti'allihîn in which he has been the originator or if mentioned by others these points have not been clearly demonstrated except by Mullâ Ṣadrâ.**

**One**-The problem of the principality of Being in clear and perfect analysis and demonstration.

**Two**-Special Unity (*tawḥîd-khâss*), correctly demonstrated.

**Three**-Motion in the category of substance in perfection and completion.

**Four**-Problem of the union of the intellect and the intelligible.

**Five**-The union of the rational soul (*nafs-e nâtiqah*) with the active intellect (*'aql-e fa'âl*) in its upward progress toward realization.

**Six**-The rule that the truth in its state of simplicity contains all things (*basât al-haq qah kull al-'ashyâ*).



and are afflicted with various sicknesses of the soul then they can cause injury and insult to fall upon the author of the book as was the case with Mullâ Sadrâ.

**The writings of Mullâ Sadrâ** are numerous such as the commentary upon the '*Usûl-e kâfi* and *Mafâtih al-ghaib*, which he wrote as an introduction to the Quran, a commentary upon the Quran in which he has revealed the meaning of the important verses of the Book, *al-'Asfâr al-'arba'ah* on metaphysics in four journeys (*safar*), *al-Shawâhid al-rubûbiyah*, which is an excellent and difficult book, *al-Mabdâ' wa'l-ma'âd*, commentary upon the *al-Hidâyah* of 'Athirî, *Risâlat al-hudûth*, *Kitâb al-mazâhir*, *Kitâb al-mashâ'ir*, *Hikmat al-'arshîyah*, *Kitâb 'asrâr al-'âyât*, *Risâlah fi'l-hashr* ( the resurrection of all beings ), *Risâlah fi tashakkkhus*, *Risâlah fi 'ittisâf al-mâhiyah wa'l-wujûd*, *Risâlah* by the name of *Sirr al-nuqtah*, *Risâlah fi khalq al-'a'mâl*, *Risâlah fi tasawwur wa'l-tasdiq*, *Risâlah 'ajûbah nasîriyah*, *Risâlah kasr al-'asnâm*, *Risâlah* in the answers to questions posed by his contemporary Shams al-Din Gilânî, glosses and commentaries upon the '*Ilâhiyât* of the *Shufâ'*, glosses upon the logic and metaphysics of *Hikmah al-'ishraq* of Suhrawardî, and other writings some of which have perhaps become lost.

### **His Students and Disciples**

'Allâhwirdî Khân, who was one of the leading figures of the Safavid period, built a school in Shiraz by the name of Khan which still stands and succeeded in bringing Sadr al-Muti'allihîn there to teach. During the many years in which he taught there 'Âkhûnd trained many students some of whom are known to us. These disciples include: First, Muḥammad ibn Murtidâ entitled Muḥsin and having the pen name al-Faid al-Kâshânî who had a special relation with the master and was also his son-in-law. Second, Maulâ 'Abd al-Razzâq ibn al-Husain al-Lâhijî having the pen name Fayyâd who was also the son-in-law of the master and was a real scholar and sage

by the fact that an opinion of Sadr al-Dîn on intention in making ablutions has been mentioned in the *Hadâ'iq* that "the master of the moderns" ('*Ustâdh al-muti'akhkhirîn*), Shaikh Murtidâ has also cited in his book *Tahârah* and in both cases Sadr al-Dîn has been praised and his opinion accepted. And it seems to us that we have seen this matter ourselves in the *Sharh-e 'usûl-e kâfi*.

In the knowledge of the biography of famous men ('*ilm al-rijâl*) he was unmatched in his day as shown in the *Sharh-e 'usûl* where he gives a detailed discussion of the life of the transmitters of the traditions (*hadîths*) of the book *Kâfi*. Sadr al-Dîn was also well versed in the branches of mathematics like geometry and astronomy as can be seen in his commentary upon the *Hidâyah* of 'Athîr al-Dîn 'Abharî. However, the greatest virtue of Sadr al-Muti'allihîn in the sciences was in his harmonization and coordination of the principles of metaphysics (as derived from ancient philosophy and theosophy) (*hikmat-e 'ilâhî*) with the principles of gnosis ('*irfân*) and the method of the gnostics whereas before him the differences between the flame of theosophy and the *sapientia* of gnosis was well known.

### **Sadr al-Dîn's degree of asceticism**

He was in general oblivious to worldly things and material objects and never thought to speak in the language of the masses. In a period when the majority of writers named their books after the king or various ministers and dignitaries of the time, Mullâ Sadrâ never adopted such a habit and in none of his numerous writings is there a reference to any of the social and political figures of the time. Yet, despite all these virtues, we think that he was somewhat simple-natured and did not exercise enough discrimination in his writings. Certain realities, although true, should not be expressed in works which become public documents, truths of a metaphysical order which in each age only a few people can understand. And since others do not have the capacity to understand them, they accuse the author of beliefs that are just the reverse of what he intended. And if these people have also evil intentions in their hearts

after reaching the age of adolescence by which time he had completed his elementary education and certain aspects of jurisprudence ( *fiqh* ) and its principles ( *'usûl* ) journeyed to Ispahan.

In Ispahan he studied first with the Shaikh al-'islâm of the time, Bahâ' al-Dîn 'Amilî in jurisprudence and its principles and then through his advice presented himself to the «Seal of the sages and religious authorities» ( *Khâtam al-hukamâ' wa'l-mujtahidîn* ), Sayyid Muhammad Bâqir 'Astirâbâdî, known as Dâmâd and having the pen name 'Ishrâq, to complete his education. Sadr al-Dîn learned the intellectual sciences in the most complete fashion from the inspired breath of Mîr and received the highest religious certificate ( *'ijâzah* ) to be able to give rullings of his own or *'ijtihâd* from both masters as he mentions at the beginning of his commentary upon the *'Usûl-e kâfî* naming the two great sages with the highest respect and admiration.

After returning to Shiraz, he became the object of jealousy of the pretenders to knowledge, as has been the case in the ages past and present, and was so much attacked, threatened and insulted that he left Shiraz and retired to a village near Qum. There, he passed his time in ascetic practices sanctioned by religious law, extra-religious duties, daily fasts and keeping awake at night. According to what we have learned from our masters he marched seven times on foot with the caravan to Mecca, this being certainly the most difficult of ascetic practices.

### **The lofty scholarly and philosophical position of Mullâ Sadrâ**

In the field of metaphysics, penetration into the difficult metaphysical problems, depth of understanding and excellence of taste he is peerless and without rival and in our opinion is superior and preferable to Ibn Sînâ in metaphysics and psychology ( *'ilm al-nafs* ). In the beauty of interpretation, clarity of expression and soundness of logic and explanation no one has been able to equal him.

In the science of jurisprudence also he was an authority as can be seen

**In the Name of God Most Merciful and Compassionate**

**The Life of Ṣadr al-Mutī'allihīn Shīrāzī and**

**a Discussion of Motion in the**

**Category of Substance**

**by**

**His Holiness Hajj Sayyid 'Abu'l-Hasan**

**Husainī Qazwīnī**

**Translated by**

**Seyyed Hossein Nasr**

The spiritual sage, metaphysical philosopher, illuminated gnostic and expert jurist, Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn 'Ibrāhīm al-Qazwānī Shīrāzī, is one of the greatest glories of Shī'ism and one of the most outstanding sages of Persia. His birth occurred in the year 979/1571 A.H. (lunar), for in the margin of a manuscript of the *'Asfār* in the hand writing of Qawām al-Dīn 'Aḥmad Walad, the author of the *'Asfār* who is Ṣadr al-Dīn himself, in the discussion of the union of the intellect and the intelligible in the section on general principles, where the author considers the discovery of the truth of the problem of the union of the intellect and the intelligible as a special illumination received personally from God, writes that this illumination occurred on Friday of Jamādī al-'ūlā in the year 1037/1627 A.H. when fifty eight years had passed from the author's life. His death occurred in the year 1050/1640 A.H.

His father, Mīrzā 'Ibrāhīm was one of the Safavid wazīrs. Since he did not have a male child he decided to spend a great deal of wealth in the way of God if he were to be granted with a devout and worthy son. Ṣadr al-Dīn,





of infra-human impulses and caught in the paralyzing cobweb of unintelligibility.

Seyyed Hossein Nasr

Tehran

27 Shawwâl 1380 } A.H.  
22 Farvardîn 1340 }

April 11, 1961 A.D.



In the fifth article, Mr. Muḥammad 'Ibrāhīm 'Āyatī, a lecturer in the Tehran Faculty of Theology, enumerates the titles of the various chapters of the *'Asfār* and gives their corresponding page numbers in the lithographed edition of the work which is the only complete edition in print. This article is particularly useful for those who wish to refer to some discussion in the *'Asfār* and who are not well acquainted with the work, and serves in fact as an index to the printed edition.

In the sixth article Mr. Muḥammad Taqī Danechpazhuh, one of the leading authorities on books and cataloguing in Persia and also a lecturer at the Tehran Theological Faculty, has given a complete list of the writings of Mullā Ṣadrā, making use of all the resources available to him in Persia as well as printed foreign catalogues. This article contains the most complete and correct list of Ṣadr al-Dīn's compositions compiled thus far and should serve as a reliable guide for all further research.

In addition to these articles, a long treatise approaching book length has been prepared by Mr. Ja'far Sajjādī, a member of the library of Tehran Faculty of Letters, on Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical and theological terminology. This work is a valuable study from the pen of a person who is well acquainted with this field, having written the first contemporary dictionary of philosophical terms in Persian, and should be of help in understanding the contents of Ṣadr al-Dīn's writings.


It is hoped that this celebration will make Mullā Ṣadrā better known not only among Muslim nations but in the world at large, for in his teachings is hidden that harmony between science and religion for which the contemporary world thirsts and that wisdom based on illumination and intellectual intuition which all contemporary modes of thought, both rationalistic and irrationalistic, need and without which they ultimately find themselves lost in the most abysmal darkness

of which twelve of the projected twenty volumes have been already published, discussions with Professor Henry Corbin on Shi'ah spirituality which appeared as the yearbook of *Maktab-e tashayyu'* and the recent publication of Mullâ Sadrâ's '*Asfâr*' which he is editing with his own commentary and of which three of eight volumes have already appeared.

In the present article 'Allâmah Tabâtabâ'i, after a brief account of Mullâ Sadrâ's life, deals with the major principles of his doctrines such as the unity, gradation and principalty of Being, substantial motion, the unity of the intellect and the intelligible, etc. He also discusses his special methodology and the significance of his writings as well as the names of his known works.

The third article, by Mr. Jawâd Muslih, lecturer of philosophy at the Faculty of Theology of Tehran University and also a well-known authority on Mullâ Sadrâ and the commentator and translator of the '*Asfâr*' into Persian, deals also with the principles of Sadr al-Dîn's doctrinal formation. Mr. Muslih deals in somewhat greater detail with the discussion of Being, knowledge, the soul and other matters in which Mullâ Sadrâ has expressed truths in a new fashion and has soived questions which had baffled earlier thinkers by making use of gnostic doctrines and accepting knowledge derived through illumination in addition to knowledge which is the result of discursive thought.

In the fourth article, the author of this introduction, who is associate professor of the history of science and philosophy in the Faculty of Letters and lecturer in the Faculty of Theology at Tehran University, has tried to discuss the acquaintance with Mullâ Sadrâ in the Western world and the research done on his doctrines by European scholars. In an introduction he has tried to demonstrate the reason for Sadr al-Dîn's obscurity in the Occident by appealing to the history of the intellectual and spiritual relations between East and West and the discontinuation of a real dialogue between the two worlds after the High Middle Ages.



possible to translate allof these articles into English. We take the opportunity, therefore, to introduce in brief these articles and their authors, while presanting at the same time the translation of two of them in English.

The first article on the life of Mullâ Sadrâ and substantial motion which is one of the basic features of his doctrines is by Hajj Sayyid 'Abu'l-Hasan Husainî Qazwinî, one of the most eminent sages and philosophers of present-day Persia. His Eminence, who resides in Qazwin, has a mastery over the principles of traditional theosophy or *hikmat* and a gift to teach this form of wisdom that is unique in the present age. He has trained a generation of students in Qazwin, Tehran and Qum, some of whom are well-known authorities on their own. In addition to *hikmat* this sage is also well-versed in traditional mathematics, medicine and even the occult sciences, and displays in his personality the traits of the great traditional Muslim sages or *hakims* of old who were masters of all the traditional sciences.

Hajj Sayyid 'Abu'l-Hasan, despite being one of the most outstanding authorities on the doctrines of Mullâ Sadrâ and also having the gift to write excellent Arabic and Persian, writes only on rare occasions. It was only after much pleading that he agreed to compose the present article which, after an introductory survey of Sadr al-Dîn's life and works, contains a masterly discussion of the problem of motion in the category of substance which is one of the cornerstones of Mullâ Sadrâ's intellectual edifice.

The second article, which like the first has been rendered into English, is by another eminent sage, 'Allâmah Hajj Sayyid Muhammad Husain Tabâtâbâ'i, the most prolific and productive *hakim* in present-day Persia and the most outstanding teacher of the intellectual sciences in Qum, the religious center of Shi'ism. 'Allâmah Tabâtâbâ'i in addition to many articles and notes, has published several major works such as the '*Usûl-e falsafah* in three volumes, the Quranic commentary *al-Mizân*

one in 1050/1641 in Basra where he was buried.

Mullâ Sadrâ left a rich intellectual heritage behind in his masterly works like the *al-'Asfâr al-'arba'ah*, *al-Shawâhid al-rubûbiyah*, *al-Mabda' wa'l-ma'âd*, *Sharh 'usûl al-kâfi* and *'Asrâr al-'âyât* and in the many disciples that he trained. In fact nearly the whole of the stream of intellectual life of Persia in the past three centuries has flowed from the spring of his wisdom.

The importance of Sadr al-Dîn in the history of Islam is that he succeeded finally in harmonizing faith and reason, or philosophy and religion, thereby achieving the goal which Muslim sages had been seeking since the second Islamic century. Moreover, he combined rational demonstration with religion and the two with illumination and gnosis, thereby creating a vast synthesis which stands as one of great monuments of Islamic intellectuality. In Mullâ Sadrâ, the streams of the gnostic school of Ibn 'Arabî, the *'ishrâqî* school of Suhrawardî, Peripatetic philosophy, and the revealed principles of the Islamic faith, and particularly Shi'ism, which had been converging for several centuries, finally met and became unified in a vast world view which encompasses all these perspectives in its total vision of reality.

It is to acquaint the world at large with the achievements of this great sage that the Faculty of Theology of Tehran University, under the incentive of its eminent Dean, Mr. Badi' al-Zamân Forouzanfar, who is himself one of the outstanding scholars of modern Persia and one who has done much to preserve and propagate the traditional Islamic sciences in the contemporary world, decided to celebrate the 400th anniversary of Mullâ Sadrâ's birth. Among the many activities planned for this occasion, the Theological Faculty asked several eminent authorities and scholars to write on the various aspects of Sadr al-Dîn's life, writings, doctrines and significance and has assembled the fruit of their effort in this volume.

Since the time to publish this book has been short, it has not been

In the Name of God the Most Merciful and Compassionate

## Introduction

Muhammad ibn 'Ibrāhīm Ṣadr al-Dīn Shirāzī, usually known as Mullā Ṣadrā or Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn (the foremost among the theosophers), is without doubt one of the most significant figures in the intellectual life of Islam, although outside of Persia he does not enjoy the fame of his predecessors like al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. Ṣadr al-Dīn was born in Shiraz in 979 or 980/1571 or 1572 in a powerful aristocratic family, and received his early education from his father in that city.

Being an exceptionally gifted student, Ṣadr al-Dīn soon mastered all the elementary branches of learning and in order to satiate his thirst for more advanced forms of knowledge, left for Ispahan which was the intellectual center and capital of Persia at that time. In Ispahan, Mullā Ṣadrā studied with Bahā' al-Dīn 'Amilī and Mīr Dāmād and soon became a master in all the formal sciences of his day.

The soul of Ṣadr al-Dīn was, however, in search of a truth which is not to be found in books alone, and so, the sage, after completing his formal studies, retired from the distractions of city life to a small village near Qum, by the name of Kahak, where he spent many years in asceticism and spiritual practices. At last the "eye of the heart" opened within his breast and he was granted a vision of the spiritual realities which he had previously studied theoretically.

After these two periods of formal study and self-purification, Mullā Ṣadrā returned to the active life, accepting the professorship of the Khān school in his native city of Shiraz. There, he spent the rest of his earthly life in training disciples and composing many important works on metaphysics and the religious sciences. During this period he made seven pilgrimages on foot to Mecca and passed away on the last